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OWNERSHIP OF LAND AS A PREREQUISITE TO THE
RIGHT TO VOTE: EQUAL OR UNEQUAL PROTECTION?
Much precedent has evolved concerning the extent to which the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment protects the right
to vote. In addition to its adventuresome forays into the thicket of
one man--one vote and legislative reapportionment,' the Supreme Court
has invoked the equal protection clause to void limitations on the
franchise on the basis of status' and wealth.' At stake in these cases
was the privilege of participation in state and federal general elections
for the selection of political representatives. In defense of its con-
clusions the Court has hastened to emphasize that the vote is "close to
the core of our constitutional system" 4 and among our "fundamental
rights and liberties," ' so that any infringements "must be closely
scrutinized and carefully confined." ' More recently, additional equal
protection issues have arisen testing the scope of this "close scrutiny"
in a slightly different context: local elections dealing not with the
selection of legislators but with particular local propositions. Two
lower federal courts appear to have reached inconsistent results on the
issue of the permissibility of conditioning the right to participate in
such decisions upon the ownership of and payment of tax upon real
property.
In Pierce v. Village of Ossining 7 a group of resident nonproperty
owners challenged a provision of New York state law that permits local
municipalities to limit the vote to owners of taxable real estate.' The
particular proposition involved in the local referendum was whether
to change the form of village government from a mayoral system to a
village manager system. Noting that the "proposition on which
plaintiffs have been excluded from voting would work a fundamental
change in the village," 9 the court struck down the exclusion as an
"invidious discrimination." "o The per curiam opinion contained little
'See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S.
368 (1963) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (disenfranchisement because of military
status violative of equal protection notwithstanding legitimate state interest in insu-
lating local elections from transients and recognition that military status is a good
test of transiency).
8 Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (state poll tax violates equal
protection).
4 Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965).
5 Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).6 1d. See also Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 153 (1965).
7292 F. Supp. 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8 N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 4-402(b) (McKinney 1966).
9 292 F. Supp. at 115.
-0Id. But see Harris v. McMillan, 186 Ga. 529, 198 S.E. 250 (1938). Harris
involved a similar voting restriction for mayoral and councilmanic elections. The
limitation was found consonant with the state constitution. The equal protection clause
of the federal constitution was not even adverted to in the opinion.
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analysis, merely citing the Supreme Court's decisions in Harper v.
Board of Elections"1 and Carrington v. Rash 2 and noting that the
defendants did not even choose to defend on the merits. 3
Several months earlier, a federal district court in Louisiana had
reached the opposite result. In Cipriano v. City of Houma,'4 a local
referendum was conducted to secure approval of a revenue bond issue
for the construction of an electric utility. Participation in this sort
of election is restricted by the Louisiana state constitution 1c and en-
abling legislation' 6 to property owners and taxpayers. Although this
denied a voice in the decision to a majority of the residents of the
city: 7 (as was also the case in Pierce),"8 the court found no violation
of the equal protection clause. This conclusion presents difficulties.
Cipriano first sought to distinguish Harper v. Board of Elections,9
the case thought dispositive in Pierce ° In Harper the Supreme Court
held a state poll tax invalid on the grounds that "wealth or payment of
a fee as a measure of a voter's qualifications is . . . a capricious or
irrelevant factor." 21 If the property ownership limitation of the
Louisiana constitutional scheme is intended solely to, or without other
justification has the effect of, restricting the vote to a presumptively
wealthier segment of the community, it would seem to run afoul of the
Harper rationale.
Cipriano, however, claimed to discern an operative distinction in
the fact that the poll tax struck down in Harper concerned the general
franchise whereas the disability in Cipriano involved only participation
in the decision of a particular municipal issue. The distinction in the
case, however, is one without constitutional significance. It is true that
the cases that have emphasized the preciousness of the franchise and the
zealousness with which it must be guarded from discriminatory in-
fringement have involved the general franchise.22 But the root concern
"1383 U.S. 663 (1966).
12 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
13 292 F. Supp. at 115:
the chief arguments presented on behalf of defendants go . . . to various
considerations which might lead a court to withhold equitable relief.
14286 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. La. 1968), prob. juris. noted, 89 S. Ct. - (1969) (No.
705). Judge Wisdom dissented.
1 5 
LA. CONST. art. 14, §§ 14(a), (m).
16 LA. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 33:4258 (1966).
17The City of Houma has a resident population of 35,000. As of October 24,
1967, it had 11,606 registered voters. Of these, only 4,680 were property taxpayers,
2,724 of whom voted in the election in question. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 286 F.
Supp. 823, 829 (E.D. La. 1968).
Is The resident population of Ossining, New York is about 22,300, slightly less
than 10,000 of whom are qualified to vote in general elections. However, only 4,500
are owners of tax-assessed property. Pierce v. City of Ossining, 292 F. Supp. 113,
115 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
19 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
20 And by judge Wisdom, dissenting. 286 F. Supp. at 828.
21383 U.S. at 668.
22 See notes 2-6 supra and accompanying text.
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of Harper and the other voting cases was the importance of self-
determination, and the primacy in our constitutional system of the
opportunity to participate in the democratic process.' This concern is
just as relevant as regards a local proposition as it is to the selection
of state or federal representatives. Although general disenfranchise-
ment is by definition more of a deprivation than disenfranchisement on
a local proposition, 4 unless the disability is de minimis its constitutional
vice remains.25 At any rate, there is no suggestion in Harper that the
demands of equal protection would so nicely vary according to the
object of the particular electoral process; it is sufficient to note that
such issues as community indebtedness and utility service are sig-
nificant local decisions warranting close scrutiny of any bar to par-
ticipation. Last, and perhaps most important, the irrelevance perceived
in Harper of any wealth criterion is not reduced one whit by the
difference in the type of election. Thus, if the Louisiana property
ownership voting restriction amounts to no more than a disguised or
indirect poll tax, Harper directly controls.
It might be argued that property ownership is, in this context,
more than a simple test of wealth; this was the position taken by the
city of Houma. If so, the measure could escape at least the per se
condemnation of Harper.
The State of Louisiana, as an intervening defendant, argued suc-
cessfully that the real estate tax payment requirement was a valid
limitation on the power of the municipality to go into debt, 26 analogous
to the state constitutional debt limitations placed on other types of
23 See text accompanying notes 4-5 .mpra.
24 This was apparently the view of the majority in Cipriano. It was suggested
that the principle vice of a restriction upon statewide voting is that it denies a chance
to end the restriction through political action. Local restrictions however, can be
overborne by state legislative action or a change in the state constitution. In these
latter situations those excluded on the local level can work on the statewide level for
the abolition of the exclusion through the election of appropriately inclined political
representatives. 286 F. Supp. at 827-28. See also Kramer v. Union Free School Dis-
trict, 379 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir. 1967) (Lumbard, C. J., dissenting). This argument
would appear all the stronger in light of the reapportionment cases (see note 1 supfra) ;
not only is there access to the state legislature to cure local voting inequities, but
that the legislature will be fairly apportioned. However, Avery v. Midland County,
390 U.S. 474 (1968), extended the rule of one man-one vote to county elections.
Thus it would be unsafe to assume that the Supreme Court would presently be
receptive to any argument based solely on political accessibility at the state level.
25Query, for example, the relative importance, both apprehended and actual, of
a bond issue sorely needed by the local school system and a vote for United States
Senator in a one-party state.
26 Brief for Defendant at 4-5; 286 F. Supp. at 827. At least two other cases have
advanced a like justification for similar voting restrictions. In State ex rel. Voiles v.
Johnson County High School, 43 Wyo. 494, 5 P.2d 255 (1931), school bond issues had
to be approved by a majority of each of two classes: (1) owners of real property and
(2) residents in general, including property owners. In sustaining the added electoral
weight thus given to the property owners, the court asserted that a purpose of the
scheme was "to place additional restrictions on the right of the municipality to borrow
money on its written obligations." Id. at 505, 5 P.2d at 258. Accord, Spitzer v. Village
of Fulton, 172 N.Y. 285, 64 N.E. 957 (1902). In neither of these cases was the equal
protection issue raised; the only point at issue was the permissibility of the limitations
in terms of state constitutional standards.
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bonds.17  However, these other debt limitations are fixed math-
ematically,28 and while debt limitation might be a legitimate com-
munity objective, the reasonableness of this particular means is
doubtful. The assumption that debt limitation is a legitimate goal
implies some notion of an optimum or at least, a maximum desirable
level of indebtedness. But there is no reason to suspect that this par-
ticular limitation on the right to vote would in any way tend to insure
the defeat of any proposed bond issues which, if passed, would cause
the aggregate indebtedness of the municipality either to deviate from
the optimum or to exceed the desired maximum, whatever these unde-
fined figures may be. At the least, unless it can be shown that owners
of real estate as a group have any particular orientation in this regard
that would further a demonstrable community interest, the debt limita-
tion theory makes little sense. Given that any group would probably
oppose further indebtedness at some level, there is nothing to make
this particular limitation any more rational than a restriction, to those
with light hair or to those with brown eyes.
The principal and interest on the bond issue involved in Cipriano
would be repaid from operating revenues to be derived from utility
consumers.2" Since the servicing and retirement of the bond would
not necessitate any tax increase, there would appear to be no tax
minimization motive to distinguish the attitudes of property owners
from those of the citizenry at large. It might be a reasonable hypothesis
that the construction of the utility, if needed, would tend to inflate local
real estate values, and that property taxpayers would tend in conse-
quence to favor such a bond issue, but this is scarcely consistent with
the notion of the voting restriction as a debt limiting device.
It was also stressed in Cipriano that the process for mandating the
revenue bond was dissimilar to an ordinary election.3" The question
arises only after passage of an appropriate resolution by the municipal
governing body,31 and even if the issue is approved by a majority of
those voting, 'the decision is not binding unless subsequently ratified by
the city council.32 This lack of finality, however, does not render the
referendum unimportant. It still remains open for a majority to
categorically veto the proposal, and conversely, majority approval is
still essential to the issuance of the bond. Furthermore, even though
this procedure is not identical to the normal electoral process, it would
be difficult to categorize it as an administrative decision.
33  A body of
27 Utility revenue bonds of the type here in question are not computed in deter-
mining the permissible limits of local public indebtedness, as are general obligation
bonds. LA. CONsT. art. 14, §§ 14(f), (m).
28 See note 27 supra.
29 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4251-53 (1966).
30 286 F. Supp. at 286.
3 1 LA. REy. STAT. ANN. § 33:4251 (1966).
32Id. § 33:4258.
33 But cf. Oregon-Wisconsin Timber Holding Company v. Coos County, 71 Ore.
462, 467-8, 142 P. 575, 577 (1914).
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over forty-five hundred " scarcely resembles traditional notions of an
administrative agency. Even if the property owners' approval were so
characterized, there would still remain the problem of the absence of
any standard, either express or implicit, to guide the decision. On
the contrary, those voting not only were left free but were even
expected to vote solely for reasons of self-interest.3 5 If the doctrine of
illegal delegation of legislative power has any current vitality what-
soever, 0 it would present a great obstacle to this line of justification.
As an alternative defense, the city of Houma argued that the
voting limitation was reasonable because it restricted popular par-
ticipation to those truly interested in the proposition.3 7  This con-
tention, if accepted, would serve to distinguish Cipriano from the
situation in Pierce: all citizens presumably have an equal concern for
the form and structure of their local government.-3 There seems
nothing constitutionally objectionable about this approach, at least in
theory. The Supreme Court's prior approval of residency require-
ments to protect local elections from transients' votes 3 9 gives support,
at least in the broad sense, to the notion that elections may be re-
stricted to those "interested." Perhaps then, when dealing with more
specific issues, the concept of electoral interest can be drawn more
narrowly to permit even broader restrictions upon the right to vote.
The obvious problem, of course, is to define the electoral interest
of the class of property owners and to demonstrate the lack of a
significant interest in their propertyless brethen. In such an endeavor,
the court in Cipriano first noted that it could be reasonably thought
"that property owners by and large have a greater and more permanent
economic stake in the community than nonproperty owners." 40 How-
ever, even if this is true, it does not support the classification. The
"greater . . . economic stake" probably means nothing more than that
they constitute a wealthier class. The future prosperity of the com-
34 See note 17 supra.
35 See note 52 infra.
36 This is not of course a federal question in this context. See K. DAvis, ADmINIS-
TRATIvE LAW TEXT § 2.08 (1959). The force of the argument, however, might exert
influence smb silentio on the resolution of the equal protection issue.
87A number of state cases have in the past justified the limitation of the franchise
to those who own taxable real property on the basis that this group has a particular
interest, usually financial, in the bond issue. State ex rel. Voiles v. Johnson, 43
Wyo. 494, 5 P.2d 255 (1931) ; Hartman v. Meier, 39 Idaho 261, 227 P. 25 (1924) ;
Oregon-Wisconsin Timber Holding Co. v. Coos County, 71 Ore. 462, 142 P. 575
(1914) ; Spitzer v. Village of Fulton, 172 N.Y. 285, 64 N.E. 957 (1902). In each of
the cases the issue was whether the voting restriction comported with the state con-
stitution rather than with the equal protection clause of the federal constitution.
One recent federal case did defend a voter restriction on the basis of exclusivity of
interest. In Kramer v. Union Free School District, 282 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1968),
prob. 11fs, noted, 89 S. Ct 117 (1968) (No. 258), a three-judge district court, one
judge dissenting, upheld N.Y. EDuc. LAw § 2012 (McKinney Supp. 1968), which
limits voting in school district meetings to property owners and their spouses, lessees
(but not their spouses), and parents or guardians of school-age children.3
8 See text accompanying notes 7-10 upra.
39 Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
40 286 F. Supp. at 827.
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munity can be and probably is just as important to those of more
modest means. A local economic recession, for example, may entail
serious financial consequences to the propertied class, but it would be
equally, if not more disastrous, to the local apartment dweller who
is laid off or even loses his job due to the closing of a local industry.
Property owners may have a more permanent interest in the com-
munity, but this crude generalization is a tenuous 41 basis for exclusion
from an activity "close to the core of our constitutional system." 42
There are undoubtedly many landless persons who have a permanent
stake in the community, and to exclude all of them on this basis is to
erect a seriously underinclusive classification.43
The court also speculated that property owners might reasonably
be thought to have a special electoral interest in the bond issue in that
the value of their properties might be directly affected. 4 This is
certainly not true in the sense of increased taxes, since the bonds would
be retired solely from the revenues of the utility,45 and even if the
utility failed altogether the bondholders would have no claim upon
general municipal financial resources.4 6 It is true, as the court ob-
served,4 7 that real estate values might be affected by the quality and
cost of utility service. Generically, however, this is merely a financial
interest, and others in the community also share a concern for the cost
of electrical service. Many who do not own real estate doubtlessly
purchase electrical service from the utility and, as succinctly put by
Judge Wisdom, "they are no less interested in the amount of their
light bills." 4 Even tenants whose rents include a charge for electrical
service will find their rent reflecting this expense, unless one makes
the rather implausible assumption that the local demand for rented
real estate is totally inelastic.49 And as to concern for the quality
of service, power failures will certainly darken rented premises with
equal inconvenience.
Turning from consideration of the relative efficiency and expense
of electrical services offered to individual consumers to the profitability
of the utility, there again fails to materialize any special interest of
41 See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94-97 (1965).
42 1d. at 96.
43See generally Tusman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CArF. L. REv. 341, 344-53 (1949).
44286 F. Supp. at 827.
45 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4253 (1966).
4 6 Id.
47286 F. Supp. at 827.
48 Id. at 829 (Wisdom, J, dissenting).
49 This same consideration would also be relevant to assessing the uniqueness
of the financial interest of the landed class if the bonds were a general obligation on
the fisc. In such a case, there would be a possibility of a rise in the ad valorem tax.
Even here, there would be a strong possibility that the incidence of the tax increment
would be borne in large measure by the tenant class. See generally P. SAMUELSON,
EcONOMiCS 208-10 (5th ed. 1961).
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property owners to distinguish their concerns from those of others in
the community. As previously noted, even the complete financial
failure of the enterprise would in no way imperil the municipality's
general fund so as to make necessary a rise in the property tax rate. By
the terms of the bonds the holders in such circumstances would be
without recourse. Nevertheless, it is contended in Cipriano that the
failure of the utility might cause an impairment of the city's credit by
deterring potential investors in future projects.50 This contingency,
however, in no way harms only the interests of the propertied class.
This impairment of credit might in the future frustrate the attainment
through bond financing of any number of municipal goals, education
for instance, which would benefit the community as a whole.
On the other hand, if the utility were profitable, all surplus
revenues would be transferred to the city's general fund to help
achieve any governmental purpose: fire protection, police protection or
any other municipal service. Thus it is said by Cipriano that the
property owners might have a special interest in relieving themselves
of some of the financial burden that would otherwise be borne by
ad valorem taxation of their real estate." This may constitute a
"especial interest" in some sense of the term, but surely it cannot sustain
the constitutionality of this distinction. To the contrary, it serves to
emphasize the invidiousness of the classification. Those who do not
own and pay tax upon real property have an equally special, albeit
diametrically opposed, interest: to wit, the maximization of the portion
of city expenses borne by property taxation. 52  From the perspective
of those who stand to gain from the operation of a utility with surplus
profits, the situation is not dissimilar to limiting the vote to property
owners where the question is whether to increase municipal revenues
by raising either the property tax rate or the sales or wage tax rates.
Furthermore, even assuming that those who pay real estate taxes
have some sort of unique pocketbook interest, the constitutionality of
the voting restriction might yet be suspect. Is there any reason to
suppose that the command of equal protection requires only the par-
ticipation of those with interests consistent with the valuable though
simplistic assumption of classical economics that man is motivated
solely by considerations of economic profitability? As one example,
suppose a decision were to be made concerning the sale of state forest
lands to private lumber companies. It is likely that the major political
issues involved would be questions of conservation and public recreation
rather than the adequacy of the sale price.
5 286 F. Supp. at 827.
51Id.
52 Apparently the City of Houma conducted a rather extensive advertising cam-
paign to urge passage of the bond, which tends to support this view: property owners
were urged to vote in favor of the bond as a method of assuring the protection and
preservation of low real estate tax rates. Brief for Plaintiff at 6; 286 F. Supp. at 823.
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It is also easy to hypothesize noneconomic concerns even in as
mundane a matter as the financing, construction, and operation of an
electrical utility. For example, there might be an aesthetic interest in
the power lines which transmit the electrical power, and there would
undoubtedly be a safety interest in the design and location of the lines.
If the contract for the construction of the utility was to be let to the
mayor's brother-in-law at an excessive price or to a firm that
discriminated against blacks in its hiring practices, there might be a
moral concern in the bond issue. If the purpose of the bond was to
construct a utility with large surplus capacity for the purpose of luring
new industry into the area, some might have an interest in opposing
the issue in order to preserve the rural and pastoral quality of the
community, even at the expense of a possible long-range increase in
per capita income. It would be difficult indeed to justify subordination
of any of these interests, which might be held by any segment of the
citizenry, to purely financial concerns.
CONCLUSION
Whether in a given situation any interest analysis can be devised
to support a restriction on the franchise other than residency has yet
to be fully tested." No doubt "many innovations, numerous com-
binations of old and new devices, [and] great flexibility in municipal
arrangements" 5' will remain open to the states and cities. Nevertheless,
at least since the decision in Harper a more substantial justification of
wealth-related criteria seems imperative. And given the specific situa-
tion in Cipriano, the payment of real estate tax as a condition to the
opportunity to vote is insupportable in light of the requirements of
equal protection. Even leaving aside esoteric concerns and considering
solely selfish, material interests, the restriction creates a grossly under-
inclusive classification which furthers no legitimate governmental
purpose.
03 In discussing the problems with defining who is interested in a particular issue,
one court stated:
Contemplating the possibility of some such question arising, if this statute
should be upheld, it would, perhaps, be pertinent to inquire as to the existence
of any reasonable ground of public policy upon which it might be insisted that
only those who are taxpayers upon real property should be permitted to vote
upon a proposition to issue state bonds for the purpose of highway construc-
tion or maintenance, thereby excluding from the electorate all other electors,
regardless of the amount they might pay in taxes upon live stock, farm imple-
ments, mechanics' tools, automobiles and other vehicles of transportation,
railroad properties, oil, coal and other mineral production, many of whom,
no doubt, would not only be equally interested with real estate taxpayers in
the convenience afforded by the highways so constructed and maintained, and
their welfare equally promoted or injured by the result of such an election,
and who might also be subject to taxation to pay the interest and principle
upon any such bond issue.
Simkin v. City of Rock Springs, 33 Wyo. 166, 189, 237 P. 245, 252 (1925).
54 Sailors v. Board of Educ. 387 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1967).
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